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BLD-173        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1864 
____________ 
 
JEAN COULTER, 
   Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS J. DOERR 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-01201) 
District Judge: Cathy Bissoon 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Affirmance 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 3, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 30, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Jean Coulter appeals the order of the District Court dismissing her 
amended civil rights complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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 Coulter pleaded nolo contendere to one count of aggravated assault, a second 
degree felony, on May 11, 2007 in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas.  The 
victim of the assault was Coulter‟s minor daughter.  The trial court, the Honorable 
William R. Shaffer, imposed a term of imprisonment of 15-30 months, to be followed by 
36 months of probation.  Just prior to Coulter‟s release from prison, the Commonwealth 
filed a motion with the trial court to have a condition placed on her probation that she 
have no contact in any form with her daughter while on probation, in view of the fact that 
the Commonwealth was seeking to involuntarily terminate her parental rights altogether.  
On February 2, 2010, and following a hearing, the trial court granted the 
Commonwealth‟s motion and imposed the “no contact” condition.  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, on February 25, 2011, decided and rejected Coulter‟s appeal from the 
order imposing the “no contact” condition.  
Meanwhile, Coulter‟s parental rights were terminated on January 11, 2011 
following a hearing in Orphans Court presided over by the Honorable Thomas J. Doerr, 
President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, see In re: Adoption of 
A.C., No. O.A. 57 of 2007.  The involuntary termination trial took place in 2010, and, at 
the end of the trial, Judge Doerr found that Coulter‟s parental rights should be terminated.  
The Superior Court affirmed on March 30, 2011, and the state supreme court denied 
review on July 14, 2011, and reconsideration on August 11, 2011. 
  At issue in this appeal, on September 19, 2011, Coulter filed a pro se civil rights 
action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Western District 
against President Judge Thomas J. Doerr in his individual capacity.  Coulter claimed that 
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Judge Doerr acted outside his jurisdiction and violated her fundamental rights as a parent 
when he presided over a “permanency review” hearing in September, 2009 and 
“sentenced” her to a term of probation that included a condition that she have no contact 
with her daughter for the full length of the term of probation.  Coulter demanded 
unspecified damages.  Judge Doerr moved to dismiss Coulter‟s amended complaint, Fed. 
R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), on the ground that he is absolutely immunized from a suit for 
damages.  Coulter responded that the doctrine of absolute immunity did not apply 
because Judge Doerr had acted in a corrupt and extra-judicial manner.  The Magistrate 
Judge filed a Report and Recommendation, in which he recommended that the amended 
complaint be dismissed.  Coulter filed Objections to the report.  In an order entered on 
February 28, 2012, the District Court granted Judge Doerr‟s motion and dismissed the 
amended complaint. 
 Coulter appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Judge Doerr has 
filed a motion for summary affirmance, which Coulter has opposed in writing.  Coulter 
also has filed a motion seeking sanctions against Judge Doerr‟s attorney and an 
investigation into the Magistrate Judge‟s alleged bias. 
 We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We 
exercise plenary review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, see Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 
F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001).  A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is 
unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks 
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for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the District Court 
may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to 
dismiss to a summary judgment motion, including items that are integral to or explicitly 
relied upon in the complaint.  In re Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. Securities Litig., 
184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999).  A court may also consider an “undisputedly authentic 
document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff‟s 
claims are based on the document.”  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. 
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).     
Coulter‟s amended complaint was properly dismissed.  Judges are absolutely 
immunized from a civil rights suit for money damages arising from their judicial acts.  
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 
356-57 (1978).  Further, a “judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he 
took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will 
be subject to liability only when he has acted in the „clear absence of all jurisdiction.‟”  
Id. at 357 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872)).  As a threshold matter, 
Judge Doerr did not “sentence” Coulter to a term of probation with a “no-contact” order 
as a condition of probation.  It was Judge Shaffer who, in presiding over her criminal 
case, imposed a “no contact” order in February, 2010 as a condition of her probation.  
Moreover, Judge Doerr‟s actions in Coulter‟s dependency and termination cases were 
neither “corrupt” nor “extra-judicial.”   
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Pennsylvania‟s Judicial Code provides that “the courts of common pleas shall 
have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings….”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 931(a).  If, as Coulter alleges, Judge Doerr issued a “no-contact” order in 
September, 2009 and thus prior to the one issued by Judge Shaffer, Judge Doerr did not 
act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction in doing so in a dependency proceeding.  (The 
termination proceeding had not been scheduled.)  The act alleged in Coulter‟s amended 
complaint is a function normally performed by a state court trial judge, and there is no 
suggestion that the parties dealt with Judge Doerr other than in his judicial capacity.  See 
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9; Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56.  Accordingly, Coulter is not entitled to 
money damages from Judge Doerr, and, to the extent that she is seeking injunctive relief, 
her claim is barred because section 1983 provides that injunctive relief shall not be 
granted, with certain exceptions not relevant here, in an action brought against a judge 
who has acted in his judicial capacity.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the appellee‟s motion and summarily 
 
affirm the order of the District Court dismissing the amended complaint.  Coulter‟s  
 
motion for sanctions and an investigation, and petition for a change in venue, are both  
 
denied.  There is no evidence on this record that the Magistrate Judge was anything other  
 
than completely fair and impartial.  Cf. Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc.,  
 
224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (party‟s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an  
 
adequate basis for recusal).  This Court declines to recuse. 
